- The SRS Consortium is a joint research initiative for advanced study in dynamic cooperation under the auspices of the Department of Business Administration of Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Karelian Institute of Applied Mathematics Research of Russian Academy of Sciences and the Center of Game Theory of St Petersburg State University.
- Game theory is one of the core subjects of decision sciences. To analyze decision making in an interactive environment, it draws on mathematics, statistics, economics, management science, political study and other disciplines. Theoretical research and applications in games are proceeding at increasing pace – in areas ranging from aircraft combat and missile control to market development, environmental planning, natural resources extraction, competition policy, negotiation techniques, capital accumulation, investment and inventory management. Cooperative games aim to achieve socially optimal and group-efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic action.
- The requirement for the establishment of a genuine institution for advanced study in an academic field is the availability of world-leading expertise in the field. The recent ground-breaking work by members of the SRS Consortium established a generalized theorem for the derivation of analytically tractable subgame consistent solutions and made possible the rigorous study of dynamic stochastic cooperation. It becomes the foundation for further study in the field.
- Other pioneering and definitive contributions in the field of game theory made by members in the Consortium include:
- The world’s first time-consistent solution mechanism for cooperative differential games.
- A new paradigm in game theory – randomly-furcating stochastic differential games.
- A novel class of stochastic differential games with infinite number of overlapping generations of uncertain types of players.
- The world’s first ever class of differential games with endogenous horizons solved in feedback Nash equilibria.
- The world’s first ever analysis of cooperative stochastic differential games with nontransferable payoffs and their subgame consistent solutions.
- A novel class of bargaining games – strategic concession game.
- The world’s first time-consistent solution mechanism for discrete-time cooperative dynamic games.
- The first ever analysis on institutional investor speculation in a stochastic differential games framework.
- The world’s first ever analysis on dynamically stable (time-consistent/subgame consistent) corporate joint ventures.
- The world’s first ever class of differential games with infinite overlapping generations of players in renewable resource economics.
- Solution theorem for stochastic differential games in which there is an infinite number of overlapping generations of uncertain types of players.
- Mathematical theorem for the derivation of individual player’s payoff functions in cooperative differential games with nontransferable payoffs.
- Mathematical theorem for the derivation of individual player’s payoff functions in cooperative stochastic differential games with nontransferable payoffs.
- The world’s first cooperative stochastic differential games in pollution management.
- The first ever analysis of cooperative stochastic differential games with nontransferable payoffs and their subgame consistent solutions derived.
- The first ever class of pollution management differential games with subgame consistent cooperative solutions.
- Performing advanced study, research and intellectual exchange in dynamic cooperative game theory and game science.
- Promotion of the applications of dynamic cooperative game theory to real world problems, particularly in transboundary environmental management, global financial institution reform, international business development, and sustainable energy supply.
- Disseminating and popularizing cooperative game theoretic reasoning to the public.
- Hosting an Editorial Office of the International Game Theory Review. The Review is an affiliated journal of the International Society of Dynamic Games, and the top-ranking journal in dynamic games. Its Editorial Board includes many of the world’s most eminent dynamic game theorists: George Leitmann, Guillermo Owen, Tamar Basar, Geert Jan Olsder, Leon Petrosyan, Steffen Jorgensen, Alain Haurie, Gustav Feichtinger, Josef Shinar, Koos Vrieze and David Yeung (currently Managing Editor). Nobel laureate John Nash and the President of Russian Academy of Sciences Yuri Osipov are also Associate Editors of the Review.
Office bearers of the Consortium:
- Prof. David Yeung (HKSYU)