Is China a Responsible Developing Country?
Climate Change Diplomacy and National Image Building

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Abstract
A state’s image is an important resource for wielding national power in global politics. Its prestige and reputation often influence the interactions with other states. As an emerging superpower, China is under pressure to shoulder more responsibility for tackling global climate change. The West has criticized China as a “climate criminal” that threatens global climate stability. In response, the Chinese government implemented a series of comprehensive programs to improve its image abroad. This paper examines China’s national image building in the realm of international climate politics. It draws on the official rhetoric and policy statements to discuss the innovative strategies that China employed to advance its broader diplomatic agendas. By referring to itself as a developing country, China proclaims that it has neither a historical responsibility nor the resources to mitigate climate change, and that it desperately needs the financial and technological support from the West. By employing the rhetoric of being a peace-loving and harmonious nation, China has begun to address the problems of global climate change, even though it refuses to submit to any binding emission reduction targets in the negotiations over a post-Kyoto international climate agreement.
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Sanna Kopra earned her M.A. in international relations from the University of Lapland, Finland in 2010. She is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Tampere, Finland. Her doctoral research focuses on China’s climate change diplomacy from the perspectives of international ethics and state responsibility. Email: sanna.kopra@uta.fi
Is China a Responsible Developing Country?  
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Sanna Kopra  

1. Introduction  
China has played an important but contradictory role in  
international climate change politics. On the one hand, China is a  
developing country where millions of people still live in poverty;  
on the other hand, with the intensive use of coal, it has become the  
world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2). The continuation  
of the business-as-usual policy in China would lead to a rise of  
2.7°C in global temperatures by 2050, even if all the countries in  
the world achieved an 80% reduction in their greenhouse gas  
(GHG) emissions (Watts, June 9, 2009). According to Richard N.  
Cooper (2008: 4–10), China’s total demand for energy grows by  
4.1% annually until 2025, and this makes up 12% of the world’s oil  
consumption and 39% of the world’s coal consumption.  
Furthermore, China’s CO2 emissions grow by 4% every year, even  
though its energy efficiency improves by 1.9% annually until 2025  
and its greenhouse gas emissions per citizen are lower than those  
of the developed world. In 2009, the CO2 emissions per capita  
were 5.13 tons in China, 7.54 tons in the United Kingdom, and 16.9  

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research for this article.
As China rises to power in the twenty-first century, there is a growing body of literature on its foreign policy. Many analysts perceive China as “harmful, destabilizing, and even pernicious,” threatening international order (Deng, 2006: 186). China has dismissed such criticisms and redoubled the efforts to improve its international status “as it were the most desirable value, the one that leads to power, security, and respect” (Deng, 2008: 8). Peter Hays Gries (2005: 103–105) explains that nationalism is “designed to restore, maintain, or advance public images of the nation,” and it serves as “a key—if not the key—motivator of Chinese foreign policy.” The Communist leaders often refer to the so-called century of national humiliation (1839-1949) in which the West undermined China as the world’s most sophisticated civilization, and call for the need to reconstruct the Chinese identity against the West and to restore the country’s prestige.

For years, the developed countries have called China a “climate criminal” that threatens global climate stability. They complain that the priorities of China’s environmental diplomacy are to “protect its sovereignty, acquire foreign aid and technical assistance, and promote its economic development” (Harris, 2005: 24). After the U.N. Copenhagen Conference in 2009, China was accused of “blocking the progress” on climate and environmental protection, even though the United States has done little to address the issue (Lynas, December 22, 2009; Vidal, December 20, 2009). It took a long time before China admitted being the world’s largest CO2 emitter. After the Copenhagen Conference, China sought to improve its status abroad, but most conventional studies have overlooked China’s attempt at national image building.

This article argues that China’s pursuit for a respectable image is at the center of its climate change diplomacy. Through a critical analysis of the Chinese policy statements, this study shows
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that the government deliberately presents itself “as a peace loving, responsible actor” and “as a poor developing country.” Both discourses are designed to accomplish the broader diplomatic agendas. The rhetoric of being “a responsible actor” enables China to raise its international profile and pursue its interests more easily; and that of being “a poor developing country” underlines its need for foreign assistance. These discourses justify China’s decision to reject any binding CO2 emission reduction targets in the negotiations over a post-Kyoto climate agreement.

2. China’s National Image Building

A state’s image is an important resource for wielding national power in global politics. During the Cold War, the realistic school of international relations emphasized the pursuit of prestige, image, and reputation in order to win the balance of power. In the 1960s, Hans J. Morgenthau stated that the national image or “the mental picture—that is, our prestige” “determinates what we are as members of society.” Individuals and states seek to be reputable because “in the struggle for existence and power...what others think about us is as important as what we actually are.” Hence, a “policy of prestige” is “an indispensable element of a rational foreign policy; states strive to impress other nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses” (Morgenthau, 1993: 84–93). Similarly, Daniel J. Boorstin explains that prestige is determined by the others’ respect for one’s image:

When we talk of prestige abroad, we are talking not of ourselves, but of the shadows of ourselves which we can somehow project. To compare prestige, then, is to compare
the appeal of images. To insist on our prestige is to insist on
the appeal of our image (Boorstin, 1977: 247).

Both Morgenthau and Boorstin agree that one’s prestige
determinates one’s role in society. In order to gain prestige, we try
to improve our image rather than ourselves because we “live in
applies this principle to the study of international relations and
shows that as rational actors, modern states continue to project
their desired images to achieve political objectives. Jervis defines
an actor as “those of his beliefs about the other that affect his
predictions of how the other will behave under various
circumstances.” The image of a state often influences the
interactions with other states. A good image generates trust and
cooperation, whereas a bad one provokes hostile reactions and
undermines the state’s security. Therefore, the image of a state is a
key factor determining “whether and how easily the state can
reach its goals”—perhaps even more significant than the
expansion of military and economic power (Jervis, 1970: 5–8).

Building up a favorable image is essential for attaining a
competitive ranking in the world because some states rank better
than the others. If only one country existed in the world, it would
not concern about its image. Because of the interstate competition,
national image building is critical to national security. According
to the realists of politics, the image of a state can wield an
important degree of deterrence. Niccolò Machiavelli argued
centuries ago that if a state had a reputation of strength and power,
other states would not dare to challenge or lie to it (Machiavelli,
1988: 64). By drawing on the concept of national image building to
analyze China’s climate change diplomacy, this article
acknowledges the limitations of realism in global politics. For
example, hard factors such as economic and military power play a less important role in the image building process. As the world is becoming more interdependent than before, many states seek to present themselves as responsible, cooperative, and credible members of the global community. The cost of non-credibility is incalculable, and credibility—“to be believed—is a significant source of attraction and soft power” (Nye Jr., 2004: 31). The image of states often determines the level of soft power that they have, and states can easily increase their global influence by making themselves more appealing to the world (Koski, 2005).

In the Chinese context, the concept of face refers to human concerns over honor and respect. As Peter Hays Gries (2004: 24) explains, face is “fundamentally political, involving a contest over power,” and the respect for China’s national face in the international arena is an important motivator of the Chinese foreign policy. Keeping face means “maintaining authority” and the state’s national honor; losing face means “losing status and the ability to pursue instrumental goals” (Ibid., 29). The Chinese can “give face” (liu mianzi) to one another in order to maintain interpersonal harmony. The government does the likewise and insists on other countries to treat it as an equal. Since the 1990s, China has “gradually realized the importance of setting up a positive image in its relations with the outside world” (Jing, 2007: 25). According to Wang Hongying (2005), the post-Maoist state has projected an image “as an international co-operator” in global economy and politics. At present, there is a “scholarly consensus that the Chinese foreign policy has countered its negative reputation through a commitment to building a cooperative, responsible image in international society” (Deng, 2006: 186). The study of China’s image building should throw light on the complexity of the state’s diplomatic behaviors. Wang Hongying
identifies four types of image-behavior relationships. First, there is “a big gap between China’s projected images and its foreign policy behavior” because images and behavior often have little in common. Second, China’s projected images do not have any causal effect on foreign policy behavior, but these images help to justify the government’s policies at home and abroad. Third, the government “may calculatingly engage in foreign policy behavior according to its projected images to give credibility to the latter.” Fourth, the government “may unthinkingly choose its foreign policies according to its projected images because these images indeed reflect the leadership’s conception of China’s role in international affairs.” Many international actors are aware of China’s obsession with image building, and they are keen to encourage China to become a cooperative and responsible player.

3. China as a Peace-loving and Responsible Actor
China has actively participated in the international negotiations on climate change. As China announced in its Climate Change White Paper, it made a “significant contribution to addressing global climate change.” Moreover, China always emphasized its “key role in breaking the negotiation deadlock and promoting consensus among all the parties” in the Copenhagen Conference. It highlighted Hu Jintao’s call for consensus over the climate change negotiation and Wen Jiabao’s “outstanding contributions” to the Copenhagen Conference (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). At the 2011 Durban Climate Change Conference, China installed its first pavilion, indicating its determination to tackle climate change and global warming (The People’s Daily, December 5, 2011). Since 2004, the rhetoric of “peaceful development” has become an integral part of
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the Chinese diplomacy. China renounced the pursuit of hegemony and opposed external intervention into the internal affairs of another country. Instead of adhering to the Cold War ideology of zero-sum security based on military force, China has emphasized the importance of “win-win” security and progress in global politics (Shirk, 2007: 129). It pledges to strengthen international cooperation based on mutual trust and mutual benefit so that all the partners can win. The win-win rhetoric suggests that China’s economic rise does not threaten other states, but instead offers them great business opportunities. As Hu Jintao (2008) stated, “We should foster the idea that helping others is helping oneself and make our endeavor on climate change a win-win for both developed and developing countries and a win-win for both the interests of individual countries and the common interests of humanity.” He (2008) continued, “China is ready to work unremittingly with the rest of the international community to achieve harmonious, clean and sustainable development in the world.”

Ideologically, pragmatism has dictated China’s strategic thinking (Lee, Nedilsky, and Cheung, eds., 2012). The government have doubled up the efforts to “replace socialist ideas and absorb Confucianism as a dominant ideology” (Cho and Jeong, 2008: 471). It no longer speaks of Marxism and Communism which are the hyponyms of totalitarianism (Fairclough, 1989: 116). Currently, China seeks to soften its global image, to cultivate its soft power, and to reduce the fear of the “China threat” by highlighting its benevolent Confucianism as a source of political inspiration. In diplomacy, China has drawn on the Confucian values and terminologies to “project a pacifist cultural image” (Cao, 2007: 436). For instance, the government launched the lexicon of “harmonious world” at the United Nations Summit in 2005 (Ding, 2008: 193).
The government equally reiterates the lexicon of harmony in the international climate policy negotiations. By using metaphors with positive connotations, it sets out to consolidate solidarity and togetherness with the developing world. “Our homeland” and “Mother Earth” in particular can be interpreted by the global community as universal values that “play an important role in argumentation because they allow us to present specific values, those upon which specific groups reach agreement, as more determined aspects of these universal values” (Perelman, 1982: 26–27). These wordings can be seen in many official announcements: “China’s policies, measures, and actions to combat climate change, demonstrate the country’s sense of responsibility for the survival and development of mankind and the future of our Mother Earth” (Delegation of China, 2009). “The international community must act in accordance with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. It must recognize that helping others is helping oneself and harming others is harming oneself, actively tackle climate change, and work together to make our homeland a better place” (Wen Jiabao, 2008).

In the early 1990s, Joseph Nye Jr. introduced the concept of soft power (i.e., the ability to get what one wants through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion and dominance) to conceptualize the complexity of post-Cold War politics. In fact, the ancient Chinese philosophers had long identified consensus as a key to survival and development. The contemporary concept of soft power is too American-centric because the American values and practices are being seen as global while they are not. On the surface, the Chinese political ideals do not match the American ones such as human rights, democracy, and freedom. China, however, has appealed to many countries with its own version of soft power, focusing on “economic benefits, shared norms and
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values, cooperation on non-traditional issues, infatuation with new China, the mutual benefits of tourism and education, diplomacy and style, and networking and reciprocal obligations within ethnic Chinese communities.” In contrast to the American soft power, China’s soft power is inclusive and interactive because it “derives from Beijing’s courtship and what regional neighbors perceive as mutual benefits” (Percival, 2007: 111–113). One irresistible attraction of China’s modernization is the model of state-controlled economic development, and some academics have promoted the Beijing Consensus as an alternative to the Washington Consensus (Ramo, 2004).

As China rises to power, it has the political will and resources to address a wider range of diplomatic issues. In the last two decades, China generated much goodwill by offering loans, grants, debt relief, conventional weapons, scholarships, and infrastructural investments to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. On global climate change, China identifies with the developing world and expresses its willingness to help the poor countries to “improve their capability to mitigate and adapt to climate change” (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). As Xie Zhenhua (2010) stated, “China has strong sympathy for the negative impacts of climate change faced by lesser developed countries, small island countries, African countries and other developing countries.” Christine Beuermann (1997: 220) comments that the “issue of climate change is regarded as an opportunity to demonstrate and defend China’s claim and self-perception as a major player in world politics and to be leader of and speaker for developing countries.” By portraying itself as the victim of Western colonialism, China succeeded in differentiating itself from the West and gaining much support in the developing world. This rhetoric enabled China to become an
“old and true friend of the African people,” even though the “friendship with various dictators” may undermine its prestige in the West (Ding, 2008: 201-202). Because China never holds good governance as a precondition for offering aid, the developed world worries that China’s increasing presence in Africa would obstruct the growth of civil society.

China has framed climate change as a global challenge that can be solved by “extensive international cooperation” between the developed and developing world (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2008). The Communist leaders have made “full use of the United Nations’ General Assembly” and other multilateral institutions to bargain with the United States and the European Union. China has not only become an active member in all multilateral bodies but also created new regional forums such as the ASEAN Plus Three and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to advance its agendas. While in favor of the regional and sectional climate cooperation, China often refers to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol as the “most authoritative, universal, and comprehensive international framework for coping with climate change” (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2008). All other informal consultations are “supplements to rather than substitutes for the negotiation process of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol” which provide “the basic framework and legal foundation of international cooperation for addressing climate change” (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). China’s decision to uphold the U.N. system is a pragmatic one. It endorses the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” that would exempt China from meeting the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets.
China’s participation in the multilateral dialogues has been shown to be an indicative of its integration into the global society. Thomas C. Schelling (1966: 150) argues that actions are important pieces of evidence of one’s political commitment and credibility, whereas “words are cheap and not inherently credible.” Similarly, Chaïm Perelman (1982: 93) asserts that “past acts contribute to the good or bad reputation of the agent,” and that argumentation by giving examples is “to presuppose the existence of certain regularities of which the examples provide concretization.” Presenting only one example is not always convincing, but if a speaker gives “a number of examples of the same sort,” the argumentation may “move from the specific case toward a generalization.” Therefore, a series of examples convince the audience about the speaker’s argumentation (Ibid., 106). This is particularly true for China, which has implemented numerous policies to mitigate climate change, and has reduced the amount of CO2 emissions at home. According to Su Wei of the Director-General Office of China’s National Leading Group on Climate Change (2007), “China is ACTING. We will do what we should do and will do what we can do. We don’t care much for the recognition of what we’ve done. All we care for is the wellbeing and the future of mankind.” Premier Wen also stated (2009), “The Chinese government has set the target for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. This is a voluntary action China has taken in light of its national circumstances. We have not attached any condition to the target, nor have we linked it to the target of any other country. We will honor our word with real action.” These remarks reflect the growing sense of confidence among the Chinese leaders in the debate on climate change.

As with many countries, China prefers non-binding guidelines to binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets.
Before the Durban Conference in 2011, China proposed voluntary national objectives, but in Durban, China set five conditions for accepting a legally binding international treaty on climate change after 2020. These conditions included: first, rich nations pledge to enforce new carbon-cutting targets in the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol; second, the world launches the Green Climate Fund as they had agreed in Cancun under a supervisory regime; third, all countries implement the consensus of adaptation; fourth, rich nations transfer environmental technology to developing countries; and fifth, there is a guarantee of transparency and capability building in the greenhouse gas emission reduction treaty (The China Daily, December 6, 2011). On the surface, China’s announcement reflected its new commitment to tackling climate change. But China’s conditions were so rigid that left no room for negotiation. As Donald Bailey (December 6, 2011) comments, “China’s current position actually remains pretty much what it has always been: It will accept legally binding limits on its greenhouse gas emissions when Hell freezes over.”

Despite its rejection of an international climate change treaty, China has taken major steps to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. The Chinese climate policy is linked to its energy policy. A sufficient energy supply is vital for sustaining China’s economic growth, which is fuelled by energy-intensive heavy industry. In the past, the government only focused on energy supply, but it has developed new hydropower and nuclear power reactors to reduce its dependence on imported fossil fuels. Since 2009, China has become the world’s leading investor in renewable energy (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010). The share of renewable energy rose from 8.4% in 2010 to 11.4% in 2011 (Nichols, 2012). In 2003, the government set out to reduce energy demand through energy conservation. It closed ineffective power plants and factories,
promoted the use of energy-saving products, and established new standards to reduce automotive pollution. The government has set ambitious goals on energy efficiency. In the 12th Five-Year Program (2011—2015), it pledges to cut energy consumption per unit of gross domestic product by 16% and CO2 emissions by 17% by 2015 (Chen, March 28, 2011).

To date, China has avoided the hazardous growth of greenhouse gas emissions because its overall energy efficiency has improved since 1980 (Gallagher, 2007). The energy conservation programs, however, only achieve a relative cut in the CO2 emissions per unit of gross domestic product. There is no overall reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions because economic growth and rising energy consumption are the reasons for constructing more coal plants. Over half of China’s primary energy consumption still relies on coal (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007: 63). By 2030, China’s greenhouse gas emissions will be 400% above its 1990 level (Jakobson, 2009: 39). China’s Science and Technology Minister unofficially announced that the carbon emissions peak “would definitely come between 2030 and 2040.” Many scholars estimate China’s carbon emissions to peak between 2020 and 2050 (Watts, December 6, 2009). In addition, the ultimate reason for prioritizing renewable energy is to cut the cost of energy production and to gain energy security. The 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) pledged to address “the impacts of energy shortages on the economy and the country’s rising dependency on external energy sources” (Richerzhagen and Scholz, 2008: 311-312). Even though energy security and economic development take precedence over the concern for climate protection, the Chinese leaders are moving in the right direction. Nevertheless, many developed countries are skeptical of the efficacy of China’s greenhouse gas emission reduction plans because there is no
compliance enforcement. They continue to urge China, the world’s highest CO2 emitter, to adhere to a binding agreement in order to tackle climate change.

4. China as a Poor Developing Country
Despite its economic boom, China is classified as a developing country. As many as 128 million rural inhabitants live under the official poverty line of US$1.25 a day. The central government sees it necessary to “complete the historical task of industrialization and urbanization” (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). In formulating its discourse of climate change, China underlines its status as a poor country and reminds the developed world that its national development is a formidable task (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2008). As economic growth is of decisive importance, the government is unwilling to take dramatic actions that would raise the cost of doing business in China. Otherwise, the foreign investors would move to countries with cheaper labor and less strict climate standards.

Global climate change, however, has threatened China’s ecological system and its socioeconomic development. In financial terms, Nicholas Stern (2006: 106) estimates that from 1988 to 2004, “China experienced economic losses from drought and flood equating to 1.2% and 0.8% of GDP, respectively.” J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley C. Parks (2007) draw attention to the number of people killed, made homeless, or otherwise damaged by climate-related disasters such as floods, heat waves, droughts, and windstorms. From 1980 to 2002, 45,000 people were killed and fifty million became homeless in climate-related disasters (Roberts and Parks, 2007: 76). It is difficult to assess the extent to which global
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climate change led to many previous natural disasters. But many Chinese are still living in areas vulnerable to climate-related risks, and the frequency and intensity of disasters will continue to rise. Scientific findings suggest that climate patterns are changing in China: the average surface temperature increased between 0.5°C and 0.8°C in the twentieth century; the mountain glaciers are melting at an accelerated rate; the intensity of heat waves becomes severe in many provinces in the north; and there is a heavy precipitation in the south. Many inland lakes and rivers have dried up due to the rapid economic and population growth. Serious water shortages will lead to a fall in agricultural output, raising alarm about food security (National Development and Reform Commission, 2007). At least 150 million people need to be relocated due to climate change (Watts, May 18, 2009).

China is aware of the devastating impacts of global climate change, and has criticized the West for imposing a greenhouse gas emission reduction agreement on the world. As Wen Jiabao (2008) pointed out, “If we look at the world history of development, we will see that developed countries encountered their resource and environmental challenges during the course of 200 years of industrialization. But we are confronted with the challenges at the same time. In addition, we have to address in a much shorter time frame the issue of energy conservation and pollution control which has taken the developed countries decades to tackle after they became highly developed. The difficulties we face are therefore unprecedented.” China has aligned itself with the G77 group in climate change debates. Seeing environmental protection as compatible with poverty eradication, China demands all climate change actions to be in line with the United Nations Millennium Goals. By framing climate change as a development issue, China insists that technological solutions are the key to the success of
climate protection. China still needs the financial and technological support of the West but it does not intend to seek assistance explicitly. Rhetorically, China finds it more feasible to speak of the needs of all developing nations as a group rather than its own interests. For example, Hu Jintao (2008) called on the developed countries “to attain the goal of emission reduction defined in the [Kyoto] Protocol and take concrete measures to honor their commitments of providing funding and technology transfer to developing countries.” Similarly, Liu Zhenmin (2007) asserts that “the key to addressing climate change lies with technological progress and with the establishment of production and consumption patterns that meet the requirements of sustainable development. The experience of various countries shows that technology is decisive in mitigating and adapting to climate change.” The West cannot deny the developing world’s request for assistance. If the former agrees to transfer funding and technology to the latter, China will definitely benefit.

The characterization of China as “the largest developing country in the world” may not be accurate. Since the developing countries are not a homogenous group and have little in common, the West proposes these countries (non-Annex I countries) to regroup themselves in the future. China publicly opposes this proposal because of its refusal to follow any legally binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Furthermore, there are no sub-categories between developed and developing nations for China, and this would weaken its diplomatic position in the international climate negotiations. China does not want to be left alone in the negotiations and therefore, in addition to its alliance with the G77, it strengthens cooperation amongst the BASIC (i.e., Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries. The BASIC countries have played an increasingly important role in global
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politics. In 2007, the BASIC collectively accounted for approximately 40% of the world’s population, and 29% of the world’s overall GHG emissions, of which China’s share was about 17% (Hallding et al., 2011: 32). Despite the group’s internal differences such as the level of industrialization and that of CO2 emissions per capita, the BASIC formed an alliance against any binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Brazil and South Africa, however, have “indicated an openness to the idea” of negotiating a binding climate change agreement (Ibid., 93).

Because China is still conditioned by the psychological burden of the century of shame, it sees itself a powerless country incapable of tackling the unprecedented climate change. The government acknowledges the problem of its greenhouse gas emissions, but it defends itself by separating the subsistence emissions of the poor from the luxury emissions of the rich. The luxury emissions of rich countries are excessive and should be restricted, whereas the “subsistence emissions” of developing countries are the matter of life and death. China has created new vocabularies to frame the climate change discussion.

Given its export-driven development strategy, China has not only become the “world’s factory, but also its smokestack” (Kahn and Landler, December 21, 2007). A significant proportion of its CO2 emissions are actually “offshore emissions” and the Western consumers should be responsible for the increase of GHG emissions in China. For instance, 23% of China’s CO2 emissions are caused by manufacturing goods exported to the West (Wang and Watson, 2007), and half of its increase results from the production of electronics, metals, chemicals, and textile goods (Guan et al., 2009). As the West outsourced their factories and CO2 emissions to “pollution heavens” like China, this economic restructuring has reduced the level of pollution at home. For
example, after moving its factories to China, Germany has reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 19% yearly since 1990 (Kahn and Landler, December 21, 2007). If one takes into account this structural factor, one should not blame China for being the world’s largest CO2 emitter. Instead, it is necessary to reform the current system of international climate politics that only penalizes those poor workers in the developing world rather than rich consumers in the developed nations. The post-Kyoto negotiations should face the challenge of reducing the scale of consumption rather than that of greenhouse gas emissions in the production process.

5. Discussion
The Chinese engagement in the realm of global climate politics makes itself “a nation with a dual-identity” (Wu, 2001: 293). On the one hand, the government emphasizes the state’s role as a “peace loving, responsible actor.” This discourse suggests that as a credible and benevolent member of the international community, China has taken the issue of climate change seriously. On the other hand, China calls itself a “developing country” and a victim of global climate change. Therefore, it should receive the financial and technological support of the West to deal with the problem. This dualist nature is a key to understanding the Chinese climate change diplomacy. In general, China has become “more proactive, more engaged, and more flexible” in the international negotiations since the Bali Conference in 2008 (Liang, 2010: 68). Unlike the United States and Canada that withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, the Chinese participation in climate change dialogues has not only improved its image but also made the call for multilateralism more appealing to the world.
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Seen from this perspective, some commentators have urged China to replace its sense of victimhood with that of normal mentality on an international stage (Deng, 2005: 60). China can hardly justify itself as a developing country because of the economic boom. With the extravagance of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, it is difficult to convince foreigners that China is a poor nation in need of financial assistance (Jakonson, 2009: 26). Hence, China should abandon the discourse of dualism and support the regrouping of the non-Annex I countries. In so doing, China could strengthen its image as a credible global power. So far, the BASIC group has provided China with a platform to advance its diplomatic agendas and to push “a hard line as a collective rather than an individual” member-state (Hallding et al., 2011: 76). As the world’s second largest economy and a rising power, China should set the climate change agenda amongst the BASIC countries.

Without the commitment and support of the developed nations, however, the BASIC group has to appropriate the sense of victimhood as a bargaining power. Unless the developed countries change their position and provide assistance to the developing world, China has difficulty living up to its projected image as a responsible actor. According to Sarah Raine (2009), the West has to keep reminding China of the respect for democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. “If they do so consistently and fairly, this is likely to impact China’s thinking.” While China worries about the global opinion, “it will balance this listening with watching what others do.” Instead, the West should set a model for China by doing their share in global climate protection and by coordinating with the developing world. To date, the Chinese leaders remain frustrated with the West because the latter seldom appreciates the environmental progress of China.
Nevertheless, China is keen to maintain its favorable image as a cooperative partner of the international community. The fear of losing face may constrain its behaviors. As China wants to be treated as a responsible stakeholder, its climate change policy is partially shaped by the international pressure. Besides these external factors, China is under strong domestic pressures to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. After all, environmental protection and energy security are not exclusive to one another. Both issues are essential for sustaining economic growth and reducing social discontent. China has expressed its willingness to meet the absolute greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in the future as long as the West pledges to provide assistance. Evidently, China and the West have yet to work together to address global climate change.
Is China a Responsible Developing Country?

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China’s Rise to Power: Conceptions of State Governance

Editors: Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Lida V. Nedilsky, and Siu-Keung Cheung


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Description

China’s Rise to Power: Conceptions of State Governance examines how a twenty-first century contradiction—the country’s combination of authoritarian rule and a market-oriented economy in state-led capitalism—has proven simultaneously appealing and a source of domestic dissatisfaction. Balancing policy analysis with detailed investigation of escalating popular unrest, this essay collection explores the discontent that stems from the Communist leadership’s obsession with growth and control, and anticipates new space for alternative governance. As the sixth-generation leaders come of age at this critical juncture, the way out of internal crises will not necessarily be the way of the Chinese Communist Party.

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